FOSTERING POSITIVE CORPORATE CULTURE
IN THE POST-ENRON ERA
STEPHANY WATSON*
Have you considered the meaning of that word “worthy”? Weigh it
well. . . . I had rather you should be worthy possessors of one
thousand pounds honestly acquired by your own labor and industry,
than of ten millions by banks and tricks. I should rather you be
worthy shoemakers than secretaries of states or treasury acquired by
libels in newspapers. I had rather you should be worthy makers of
brooms and baskets than unworthy presidents of the United States
procured by intrigue, factious slander and corruption.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions about business ethics are in. While corporate scandals are not
new, the communication age and modern mega-corporations have made them bigger
and more spectacular than ever before. The frequent photographs of teeth-gritting,
handcuffed executives, illustrating the fast and steep fall of Enron, Arthur Andersen,
WorldCom, Tyco, and other firms, are chilling.2 How could they do it? How could
the stewards of corporate America break the law, lose their shareholders’
investments, and cause the collapse of trust in the financial markets?
At least one possible answer is that corporate ethics have been abandoned,
and greed is now king. Even if we disagree about the importance of ethics to healthy
businesses, few would argue against an ethics refresher. This article outlines ways to
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DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 608-09 (2001). President John Adams offered his opinion on
the importance of ethics to his grandchildren. Id.
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2 Kurt Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will Be Scandal. Count on It., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at C3.
Mr. Eichenwald’s article includes photographs of Andrew S. Fastow of Enron, L. Dennis Kozlowski
of Tyco International, John Rigas of Adelphia Communications, Samuel D. Waksal of ImClone, and
Scott D. Sullivan of WorldCom. Some of the executives pictured are handcuffed. Id. See also George
Soros, Why the Markets Can’t Fix Themselves, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (Sept. 2, 2002), at
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20020902&s=soros090202 (last visited Sept. 11, 2002).
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create an effective corporate compliance program and develop positive corporate
culture in the post-Enron era.
II. BACKGROUND:
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE & CORPORATE ETHICS
Narrowly defined, corporate compliance programs are those that encourage
compliance with the laws, regulations, and policies that affect a particular company.
These programs vary from company to company, and often from one work unit to
another. They can include training regarding the state and federal laws governing
unfair trade practices, discrimination, harassment, and environmental compliance, as
well as regulations and policies that affect a particular industry.3 The primary reason
for establishing corporate compliance programs is to prevent employees from
violating any of the laws, regulations, or policies that employees may encounter while
performing their jobs. However, even in the unfortunate event that a violation does
occur, having the right kind of program in place may also lessen a corporation’s
potential civil and criminal liability.4
By contrast, the term corporate ethics addresses the more philosophical
notions of honesty, fairness, responsibility, respect, and compassion.5 Most
commentators agree that good corporate compliance programs—the ones that
work—incorporate training both in legal compliance and in ethics.6 In fact, one
theme that runs consistently throughout the corporate compliance and ethics
3 For example, in the energy industry, a corporate compliance program could include training in the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s standards of conduct for companies that both market
electricity and own high-voltage transmission lines. See generally 889 F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS.. ¶
31,035, at 31,594 (1996).

See infra pp. 9–19, discussing the United States Sentencing Guidelines and In re Caremark Int’l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

4

This list is illustrative. One of the possible components of a corporate compliance and ethics
program is leading the participants through a values identification exercise. Research indicates that
the list included here appears after almost every such exercise, regardless of the age, nationality, or
occupation of the participants. RUSHWORTH KIDDER, READINGS IN ETHICS 25-60 (2001).

5

The Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission wrote that “[c]ompliance is more than
looking to the letter of the law,” and questions whether “a compliance program can be truly effective
if it does not have an ethics component.” She also stated that “[a]n ethical organization will develop
ways in which ethical dilemmas are to be resolved by management and employees. An ethical
organization will also foster and protect reporting mechanisms and reward ethical conduct.” Diana E.
Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87
IOWA L. REV. 697, 715–16 (2002).
6
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commentary is that mere compliance training, without an examination of ethics, can
often backfire with rank-and-file employees by portraying the firm as being
concerned only with avoiding legal problems for executives and maintaining big
profits for shareholders. In such cases, employees often perceive the training as
inapplicable to themselves, and they therefore ignore it. Yet rank-and-file
employees, as well as managers and executives, often have the capacity to cause great
harm to companies, which demonstrates the need for positive corporate culture to
permeate deeply throughout all personnel levels.7
A variety of legal commentaries, statutes, and cases have spurred most
Fortune 500 companies to adopt codes of conduct outlining legal requirements,
business ethics, and other aspects of business conduct.8 Companies may combine
these elements into a corporate compliance office (often with an executive corporate
compliance officer), assign the legal compliance aspect to the firm’s office of general

Note, too, that corporate downsizing increases the individual employee’s importance and decreases
managerial supervision:

7

The phenomenon of downsizing usually causes a severe reduction in the number of
personnel performing many business processes. This trend further increases the
importance of an ethical corporate culture to mainstream business operations.
Traditional control procedures like direct supervision, segregation of duties, and
approval of transactions are no longer feasible. This greatly increases the need for
better ‘soft controls.’ These include an open, interdependent, and cohesive
atmosphere of loyal teamwork exemplified by an ethical culture where individual
and corporate goals are congruent.
Dr. Curtis C. Verschoor, Corporate Performance is Closely Linked to a Strong Ethical Commitment,
STAKEHOLDER POWER (June 2001) at http://www.stakeholderpower.com/story.cfm?article_id=49
(last visited Nov. 3, 2003). See also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del.
Ch. 1996). (“[O]rdinary business decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper in the
interior of the organization can, however, vitally affect the welfare of the corporation and its ability to
achieve its various strategic and financial goals.”)
See infra pp. 9–19, discussing the United States Sentencing Guidelines and In re Caremark. Some
commentators draw a bright line at 1991, the year in which the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
which made codes of conduct a mitigating factor in sentencing for federal crimes, were adopted and
applied to organizations. Others point out that there was a significant, high-level academic movement
urging the adoption of codes many years earlier. See, e.g., Brown, infra note 47. Mr. Brown observes
that the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Law Institute concluded that
corporate codes of conduct and compliance training were an important part of good corporate
governance well before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were passed. See Brown, infra note 47, at
pp. 47–71.
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counsel, or may have dedicated ethics officers. This article explores some model
programs as part of the “how to” section near the end.

II. HISTORY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS:
ETHICS LAPSES AND RESPONSES TO THEM
From an oddly comforting perspective, corporate scandals have long been a
part of American business. Examples throughout history show that as bust follows
boom, scandal follows bust.9 One chronicler of corporate scandals writes: “[a]fter
bubbles collapse and interfere with economic growth, the resulting loss of income
stimulates efforts to maintain and increase income, both honestly and in corrupt
ways.”10 Furthermore, “[o]nce there are pressures put on profits, the obvious
incentive for management to maintain their lifestyle or their stock prices is to fiddle
with the books.”11 There is also the pragmatic point that so long as the economy is
doing well, no one knows or cares that the engine is powered by corrupt means.
One commentator describes this condition quite colorfully: “you never know who’s
swimming naked till the tide goes out.”12
American corporate ethics scandals date back at least as far as Charles
Ponzi’s famous “pyramid scheme.” In 1920, Mr. Ponzi’s company promised
investors a 50 to 100 percent return on their investments in “international postal
reply coupons,” which were purported to be postage stamps that could be sold again
and again.13 However, Mr. Ponzi did not invest the funds in anything; he merely

9

Eichenwald, supra note 2, at C3.

Charles P. Kindleberger, Corruption, Crime, Chicanery: Business Through the Ages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2002, at C3.
10

11

Eichenwald, supra note 2, at C3.

12 Remarks of Carol Loomis, ONLINE NEWSHOUR (Public Broadcasting Service, June 27, 2002), at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june02/ethics_6-27.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
13

Eichenwald, supra note 2, at C3.
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repaid earlier investors with the funds he obtained from later ones.14 Mr. Ponzi went
to prison for defrauding some 40,000 people of at least $15 million.15
Not surprisingly, the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression also
produced some enormous corporate frauds. In 1929, Albert Wiggin, the head of
Chase National Bank, short-sold 42,000 shares of his company’s stock. While this
maneuver was technically legal, the sales were detrimental to the interests of his
shareholders and led to the passage of laws prohibiting executives from short-selling
their own company’s stock.16 Another example is Ivar Krueger, the “Match King,”
who was the head of several companies that collectively made two-thirds of the
world’s matches. To stay afloat during the Depression, Krueger used hundreds of
Byzantine off-the-books ventures to hide his losses. The business ultimately
collapsed when he had a stroke and was unable to perpetuate the scheme, thus
exposing the fraud.17 Finally, Richard Whitney was the only high-level executive sent
to prison for fraud stemming from the 1929 stock market collapse.18 Mr. Whitney
was the president of the New York Stock Exchange in 1929, and after the crash he
gave powerful testimony before the Senate defending the Exchange’s ability to
regulate itself.19 Yet Mr. Whitney himself had lost large sums of money in the crash,
and he had attempted to cover his losses by stealing cash from his customers and
from a fund that was established to aid widows and orphans of stockbrokers.20
Next came the notorious “Teapot Dome Scandal,” which brought down
President Warren G. Harding’s Secretary of the Interior, and also revealed the

14

Id.

15 Ellen Florian, Schemers and Scams: A Brief History of Bad Business, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Mar. 3, 2002),
available at http://www.fortune.com/fortune/articles/0,15114,371011,00.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2003).
16

Id.

Id. Part of Enron’s demise stemmed from off-the-books partnerships, thus illustrating the
timelessness of at least some fraudulent schemes. Heesun Wee, Corporate Ethics: Right Makes Might,
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Apr. 11, 2002), at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2002/nf20020411_6350.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2004).
17

18

Eichenwald, supra note 2, at C3.

19

Id.

20

Id.
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corruption of a number of prominent oil executives.21 During the presidencies of
Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, federal
conservation laws established several oil reserves in Wyoming and California. These
public land assets were set aside for the Navy’s future use. President Harding’s
Secretary of the Interior, Albert Fall, leased Teapot Dome—a Wyoming oil reserve
located on land with a teapot-shaped natural formation—to the Mammoth Oil
Company while receiving substantial cash “gifts” from Mammoth and other lessees.
Mr. Fall was found guilty of bribery in 1929 and sentenced to one year in prison.22
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Anthony DeAngelis perpetrated the great
“salad oil swindle.”23 Mr. DeAngelis sold government surplus salad oil overseas, and
then began to speculate in salad oil futures while simultaneously amassing huge
loans. Mr. DeAngelis said the loans were secured by his stored salad oil. He was
able to attract investors despite the fact that the American Bureau of Statistics
reported that the volume of salad oil purportedly held in storage by DeAngelis’
company exceeded the entire country’s salad oil production.24 As it turned out, many
of the company’s oil tanks contained nothing but water.25
One commentator argues that modern corporate compliance programs
began after the electricity industry’s antitrust scandal in the early 1960s.26 During the
1950s, heavy electrical equipment manufacturers engaged in widespread marketsharing, bid-rigging, and price-fixing.27 When the dust settled, twenty-nine
corporations and forty-five individuals had pleaded guilty or no contest to criminal
antitrust charges. Seven executives ultimately served prison sentences—among the

21 Leslie E. Bennett, One Lesson From History: Appointment of Special Counsel and the Investigation of the
Teapot Dome Scandal, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (1999), available at
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/teapotdome.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
22

Id.

23

Eichenwald, supra note 2, at C3.

24

Id.

25

Id.

John D. Copeland, The Tyson Story: Building an Effective Ethics and Compliance Program, 5 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 305, 311 (Winter 2000); see also Florian, supra note 15, passim.
26

27

Copeland, supra note 26, at 311.
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first imprisonments in the 70-year history of the Sherman Antitrust Act.28 After the
scandal subsided, antitrust compliance codes became commonplace.29
In 1975, a number of prominent U.S. companies made questionable
payments to foreign officials.30 Lockheed, Exxon, Mobil, and Gulf were involved in
a scandal that damaged U.S. relations with NATO and brought down governments
in Japan, Bolivia, and Honduras.31 In 1977, Congress responded with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act,32 which caused many businesses to re-examine and revise
their corporate codes of conduct.33
In the early 1980s, the Washington Post reported on a number of
questionable defense contracts. The articles reported outrageous prices that the
Pentagon had paid for ordinary objects, including $9600 for a twelve-cent Allen
wrench, and $7400 for a coffee maker.34 In response, President Reagan established
the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, known popularly by its
chair’s name – the Packard Commission.35 The Packard Commission made
numerous ethics recommendations for defense contractors to follow, and some
courts and the United States Department of Justice also applied these
recommendations to other industries.36
The recommendations included
“distribut[ing] copies of the code of ethics to all employees and new hires,” and
“mak[ing] business conduct standards and typical business situations a regular part of
the employees’ experiences and performance evaluations.”37
Before the current wave of accounting scandals and outright fraud involving
Enron, Tyco, ImClone, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, the mid-1980s brought
28

Id. at 312; Florian, supra note 15, passim.

29

Copeland, supra note 26, at 312.

30

Id. at 312–13.

31

Id.

32

15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1977) (amending Title of original Act).

33

Copeland, supra note 26, at 314.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 315.

37

Id.
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the insider-trading and junk bond scandals involving Dennis B. Levine, Ivan Boesky,
and Michael R. Milken.38 As a result of insider trading and other illegal activities, all
three prominent executives went to prison, and the powerful Wall Street firm of
Drexel Burnham Lambert went bankrupt.39 In 1989, Charles Keating was convicted
of fraudulently marketing junk bonds and engaging in sham transactions.40 His firm,
Lincoln Savings and Loan, ultimately collapsed, costing taxpayers some $3.4 billion.41
In 1991, the Bank of Credit & Commerce International (“BCCI”) collapsed in a
money-laundering scandal.42 In 1995, a 28-year-old trader brought down the 233year-old Barings Bank by hiding losses he could no longer cover.43 In 2000, the
venerable auction houses Sotheby’s and Christie’s were involved in a price-fixing
scandal, resulting in prison terms and a combined payment of $524 million to their
customers.44
So what’s new? Business scandals certainly are not. However, the capacity
to do great harm in a short period of time has increased as the world has grown
smaller through globalization, improved communications, and increased market
share by fewer firms.45 For example, Enron’s collapse virtually dried up the capital
markets for energy generating projects that were not at all related to Enron or its
corrupt executives. In other generations, one firm’s bankruptcy would not have
affected an entire industry, but due to Enron’s size and its enormous financial losses,
investors have become leery of the entire energy business. Enron’s collapse may
help cause a retreat from electricity industry restructuring, something the federal
38

Eichenwald, supra note 2, at C3.

39 Id. See also Dennis B. Levine, The Inside Story Of an Inside Trader, PERSPECTIVES IN BUSINESS ETHICS
612 (Laura P. Hartman ed., 2002).
40

Florian, supra note 15, at 2.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

John Goldman, Sotheby’s Former Chairman Jailed, THE AGE, Apr. 24, 2002, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/04/23/1019441243127.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
44

In “How Good People Make Tough Choices,” Rushworth Kidder cites the examples of the
Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the Keating Five savings and
loan collapse, to illustrate the modern ability of a few ordinary people to do great harm in a short
time. The scale and power of modern scientific, technological, financial, governmental, and
educational systems “amplify small whispers of wrongdoing into vast bellows of amorality.”
RUSHWORTH KIDDER, HOW GOOD PEOPLE MAKE TOUGH CHOICES 34–35 (1995).
45
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government has advocated for over a decade. So while scandals are not new, their
ability to cause widespread damage has substantially increased.
IV. LEGAL REASONS FOR HAVING A COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
A. In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Litigation
Training programs for corporate employees regarding the legal implications
of their conduct gained new importance after the 1996 case of In re Caremark
International, Inc. Derivative Litigation.46 In early corporate law, the question of whether
a corporation itself could be found criminally liable remained unsettled. Because a
mens rea, or criminal state of mind, is a necessary element of criminal conduct, the
argument was that a “soul-less” corporation could not form a mens rea and therefore
could not commit a crime.47 Yet in 1909 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the criminal conviction of a railroad for violation of the Elkins Act stemming from
illegal payments by one of the railroad’s employees.48 The Court used the tort law
principle of respondeat superior to impute the employee’s knowledge to the
corporation.49
In contrast, some courts have found that corporate criminal liability does not
arise from respondeat superior, but from the corporate director’s non-delegable duty to
ensure that those who conduct the corporation’s business do so lawfully.50 These
older cases settled the question as to the corporate entity’s potential liability, but not

46

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

47

Case of Sutton’s Hosp., 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612). Professor Kathleen F. Brickey writes,
The corporation was recognized in law not as a natural person, but as an artificial
entity. As an abstraction, it lacked physical, mental and moral capacity to engage in
wrongful conduct, or to suffer punishment. It could neither commit criminal acts,
entertain criminal intent, nor suffer imprisonment. It had no soul and so could not
be blamed.

Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q.
393, 396 (1982), quoted in H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in
the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 72 (2001).
48

New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909).

49

Id. at 493.

United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 344 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
300 F. Supp. 84, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (quoted in Brown, supra note 47, at 78).

50
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as to the liability of individual directors and officers. That question had to wait until
the Caremark decision.
Before Caremark, a corporate director’s duty of care was widely interpreted as
having been fulfilled so long as the director did not engage in outlandish acts of
neglect.51 A director’s actions were clothed with the legal presumption of due care,
and that presumption was rarely overcome. Indeed, before Caremark, a corporate
director could behave more like an honored guest than an active steward of the
business. “In the past, being a member of a board of directors was an honor. Now,
it’s also a job carrying with it some substantial personal and professional risks.”52
The Caremark case established that corporate directors can be held personally liable
for a corporation’s wrongdoing, and that personal liability is easier to prove in the
absence of an effective corporate compliance program.53
In Caremark, a managed-care healthcare provider received substantial
revenues from Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. These reimbursements were
subject to the Anti-Referral Payments Law (“ARPL”), which prohibits healthcare

51 Directors were never meant to micromanage companies; indeed, the corporate form itself depends
on considerable distance between a board of directors and day-to-day operations.

Courts are reluctant to subject directors – particularly outside directors – to due
care liability. A number of factors explain this reluctance. First, courts realize that
no person is obligated to serve as a corporate director, especially an outside
director. If corporate law threatened directors who failed to perform at the level of
the law’s aspirations with liability, “no men [or women] of sense would take the
office . . . .” Second, shareholders, as equity investors, can be viewed as having
assumed the risk that managers will make some bad judgments resulting in business
losses. Third, fact finders viewing situations retrospectively too often may be
inclined to determine that a bad result was due to bad judgment rather than bad
luck. Finally, the threat of liability may lead directors or managers to avoid
potentially profitable but risky business opportunities or to focus on safeguarding
corporate resources.
Elliott J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 14 (1984).
Victoria M. Wessler, Corporate Board Membership: Risky Business, ETHICS & COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES,
at http://www.ethicscompliance.com/news.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). Ms. Wessler quotes John
Nash, the immediate past president and CEO of the National Association of Corporate Directors.

52

53

In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
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companies from making payments to doctors in exchange for Medicare and
Medicaid patient referrals.54
In 1991, the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human
Services began investigating Caremark for possible ARPL violations.55 Contracts
between Caremark and doctors indicated that Caremark was paying doctors for
monitoring patients under Caremark’s care, including Medicare and Medicaid
patients. In turn, some of those doctors were referring patients to Caremark. The
United States Department of Justice and other federal and state agencies joined in
the investigation.56
Shortly before the investigations commenced, and then during the
investigations, Caremark undertook a number of actions in response to the ARPL
indictment. These included providing greater supervision of its 7000 employees and
several revisions of its “Guide to Contractual Relationships,” an internal compliance
manual.57 Caremark’s outside auditor reported that there were no material
weaknesses in Caremark’s conflict control structure.58 The company also appointed
a compliance officer.59 All of these actions, as well as the minutes from meetings of
the board of directors, suggested that Caremark’s board was aware of various efforts
to assure compliance with the ARPL and other anti-kickback laws.
Despite these efforts, a federal grand jury indicted Caremark, two of its
officers, and two other employees, accusing them of violating the ARPL.60 Shortly
afterwards, five stockholder derivative actions were filed in Delaware Chancery
Court, which were later consolidated. Those cases alleged that Caremark’s directors
had breached their duty of care by failing to adequately supervise the conduct of

54

Id. at 961–62.

55

Id. at 962.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 963.

Id. Despite the auditor’s finding, Caremark’s Audit & Ethics Committee decided to
comprehensively review the company’s compliance policies and compile an employee ethics
handbook.
58

59

Id.

60

Id. at 963–64.
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Caremark employees or institute sufficient corrective measures, thereby exposing the
company to substantial fines and other liabilities.61
Caremark began settlement discussions with federal and state prosecutors.
In exchange for Caremark’s agreement to plead guilty to mail fraud and substantial
payments, federal authorities committed to an agreement that allowed Caremark to
continue participating in Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement programs.62
Caremark then executed a proposed settlement agreement in the shareholder
derivative suits, which required the Delaware Chancery Court’s approval.
In evaluating the settlement agreement, the Chancery Court asked whether
Caremark’s board of directors had breached its duty of care to the corporation by
failing to adequately oversee Caremark’s affairs, so that violations of the ARPL could
have been detected earlier, thus preventing the company’s losses.63 Caremark’s
shareholders argued that the directors allowed a situation to develop which exposed
the corporation to enormous legal liability, and that in so doing they had violated
their duty to actively monitor Caremark’s corporate performance. In describing the
corporate director’s duty of care, the court stated:
What should be understood . . . is that compliance with a director’s
duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by
reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a
corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or
rationality of the process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury
considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through “stupid” to
“egregious” or “irrational,” provides no ground for director liability,
so long as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
interests.64

61

Id. at 964.

62

The payments totaled at least $250 million. Id. at 961.

Id. Procedurally, the court pointed out that its evaluation was limited to the claims and defenses on
the discovery record. Its inquiry was whether or not the proposed settlement appeared fair to the
corporation and its absent shareholders. Id.

63

64

Id. at 967.
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The court further stated that the touchstone of any corporate law duty of care inquiry
is whether there was a “good faith effort to be informed and to exercise appropriate
judgment.”65
A breach of the duty of care may be active or passive. In the case of an active
breach, liability follows from an ill-advised or negligent board decision that results in a
loss; in a passive breach, a loss results from the board’s inaction. Allegations of a
passive breach formed the basis of the Caremark shareholders’ suit, which caused the
court to inquire, “[w]hat is the board’s responsibility with respect to the organization
and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation functions within the
law to achieve its purposes?”66
The court reviewed an earlier Delaware decision alleging a corporate director’s
breach of the duty of care. In that 1963 decision, the court stated that “there is no
duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret
out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”67 The Caremark court
declined to interpret that holding broadly, finding that a modern corporate board must
make certain that management establishes appropriate information and reporting
systems.68 In support of this interpretation, the Caremark court cited the potential
impact of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations and their mitigation
factors. The court found that failure to take the Guidelines into account in responsibly
governing an organization is not rational.69
Ultimately, the court held:
that a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.70

65

Id. at 968.

66

Id. at 968–69.

67

Id. at 969 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963)).

68

Id. at 969–70.

69

Id. at 970.

70

Id.
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While this holding contains a degree of ambiguity and reticence, the court also
offered some guidance for the real world. With regard to an “adequate” information
and reporting system, the court said that this system should be “reasonably designed to
provide to senior management and the board itself timely, accurate information
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed
judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business
performance.”71 In addition, the court stated that:
it is important that the board exercise a good faith judgment that the
corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and
design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will
come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary
operations, so that it may satisfy its responsibility.72
Thus, the reporting system must be timely and accurate, it must contain legal
compliance and business performance information, and the information must flow to
the board in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, given the Caremark court’s
frequent references to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, most commentators believe that
the “floor” for a corporate compliance reporting system must contain the elements
necessary for sentence mitigation under the Guidelines.73
The Caremark court held that the settlement offered in the motion was fair and
reasonable. It stated that, in order to show that the Caremark directors had breached
their duty of care, the plaintiffs would have to show that the directors knew or should
have known that legal violations were occurring, that the directors took no action to
prevent or remedy the violations, and that such failure caused the corporation’s loss.74
The court offered the following additional insights into its holding: First, the duty to
act in good faith to be informed does not require that a director have detailed
information about all aspects of the corporation’s enterprise.75 Second, only a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight, such as having no
reasonable reporting system, will establish the lack of good faith necessary for liability.
In acknowledging its intent to establish a high threshold for corporate director liability,
the court noted that such a high threshold benefits shareholders as a class because it
71

Id.

72

Id.

73

See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 26, at 348.

74

In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.

75

Id.
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creates an environment in which qualified people will still agree to sit on corporate
boards after Caremark.76
Subsequent litigation in Delaware indicates that the courts, on behalf of
corporate shareholders, are becoming increasingly willing to examine complaints
alleging breach of a director’s fiduciary duties. While deference to the business
judgment rule might have meant an almost automatic dismissal of this kind of
complaint before the most recent wave of corporate scandals, some are seeing a trend
towards greater scrutiny of shareholders’ allegations.77 As the federal government
increases its role in regulating corporate law—an area of law historically regulated
largely by the states—state courts may increase their corporate law activism. Greater
state court attention to shareholders’ complaints may be one way for states to show
federal regulators that they are capable of enforcing corporate law without further
federal involvement.78
B. United States Sentencing Guidelines
The Caremark case also introduced the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines mitigation
measures into the realm of civil corporate law. As the court explained, and as
commentators and other cases have shown, a corporate compliance program must,
at a minimum, contain the compliance and reporting measures outlined in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations.79 Many corporate lawyers and personnel
may have had little interest in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines before Caremark, but in
the aftermath of that case there is no doubt that the Guidelines contain the core
elements of a legally sufficient compliance program.80
First, some background about the Sentencing Guidelines is necessary. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted to eliminate inconsistent sentencing for
76

Id.

The essence of the business judgment rule is that in the absence of fraud, other egregious conduct,
or neglect, judges may defer to corporate directors’ decisions. John Gibeaut, Stock Responses, 89
A.B.A. J. 38 (2003).
77

78

Id. at 41.

79

Wessler, supra note 52.

80 Copeland, supra note 26, at 326. See also Murphy, supra note 6 at 714, citing cases after Caremark
holding that corporate directors can avoid liability in shareholder derivative suits by implementing an
effective corporate compliance program. See also Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191 (4th Cir.
2001) and McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
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federal crimes.81 The Act created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an independent
agency within the judicial branch, which was charged with developing consistent
sentencing guidelines for the federal courts.82
Guidelines for sentencing
organizations became effective on November 11, 1991.83 Of greatest interest at
present is the provision in the Guidelines for the mitigation of sentences for
corporate offenders where the corporation has an appropriate corporate compliance
program in place.84
The Guidelines state that “[t]he hallmark of an effective program to prevent
and detect violations of law is that the organization exercised due diligence in seeking
to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its employees and other agents.”85 At a
minimum, an effective program will:
(1) Establish compliance standards and procedures for its employees and
other agents that are reasonably capable of reducing improper conduct;
(2) Assign responsibility to specific, high-level personnel within the
organization to oversee compliance with the standards described above;
(3) Use “due care not to delegate substantial discretionary authority”86 to
people whom the organization knows or should know engaged in illegal activities;
(4) Take “steps to communicate effectively its standards and procedures to
all employees and other agents,”87 through training programs and publications;

81

18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1998); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2003).

82

28 U.S.C. § 991 (2003).

83 Since nationwide implementation of the sentencing guidelines, federal courts have sentenced
approximately 600,000 defendants under them. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (Apr. 18, 2003),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0403.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
84 While the guidelines promulgated for individuals center on punishment and incapacitation, the
guidelines for organizations focus on deterrence. In developing the organizational guidelines, the
Commission was cautioned that fines, even enormous ones, had done little to deter organizational
wrongdoing. Murphy, supra note 6, at 701.
85
86
87

18 U.S.C.S. App. § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k) (2004).
Id.
Id.
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(5) Take “reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards,”88 for
example, by using monitoring and auditing systems to detect improper conduct and
by having in place and publicizing a reporting system that allows employees and
other agents to report improper conduct without fear of retribution;
(6) Enforce
mechanisms; and

company

standards

through

appropriate

disciplinary

(7) Take all reasonable steps to respond to an offense and to prevent further
similar offenses.89
The Sentencing Guidelines also state that the precise elements of an effective
compliance program will depend upon a number of factors, including the size of the
organization, the type of business it operates, and its prior history of misconduct.90
Industry practice and any applicable government regulations are also part of an
effective compliance program.91 Thus, the seven elements noted above form the
basis for a corporate compliance program, but a company committed to preventing
and curing ethical lapses will tailor its program to the unique circumstances of its
own industry and workforce.
Of course, once a corporation has been accused of a crime and convicted,
mitigation may be too little, too late.92 Thus, the incentive for a corporation to
88

Id.

89 Id. See also discussion, infra, pp. 32–37, regarding “How to Establish a Corporate Compliance
Program” for more discussion of how to implement the seven elements set forth in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines.
90

18 U.S.C.S. App. § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k) (2004).

91

Id.

92

Obviously, companies want to avoid criminal convictions, even with lessened penalties:
[E]ven for the organization that is able to reduce substantially its criminal fine
through the Guidelines’ culpability factors, a criminal conviction carries high costs.
There are out-of-pocket expenses in defending the prosecution, such as attorneys’
fees and travel and investigative expenses. There are also indirect costs such as the
loss of time and attention to business matters by corporate executives and
corporate counsel who must involve themselves in the criminal investigation and
defense. Other devastating costs may follow a conviction. Even if the sentencing
court reduces the criminal fine by applying the culpability factors, collateral
consequences may arise which the Guidelines cannot reduce . . . . [C]onsequences
such as suspension or elimination from governmental programs, loss of
professional licenses necessary to continue in business, imposition of substantial
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develop and implement a compliance program that actually prevents corporate
employees from committing crimes remains the most important feature of the
mitigation program.93 After all, the focus of any corporate compliance program
should be prevention, not damage control.94
C. Administrative Debarment
Corporate compliance programs may also help reduce a company’s chances
of being banned or “debarred” from contracting opportunities with federal agencies.
Historically, agencies began exercising administrative discretion to debar federal
contractors in the late 1920s.95
These discretionary decisions were often
inconsistent, giving rise to Constitutional due process concerns. In 1982, the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy issued a letter setting forth rules for standardized
government-wide debarment, which were codified as part of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (“FAR”).96 Under the FAR, government contractors must have a
administration and civil fines, termination of insurance, and denial of applications
for expansion may effectively ruin a corporation. In addition to these collateral
consequences, the convicted corporation may face adverse publicity. In some
instances, adverse publicity alone can cause corporate devastation, as when
depositors flock to withdraw deposits from a convicted, or even indicted, financial
institution.
Brown, supra note 47 at 90, quoting Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before
the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 352-53 (1993).
93

Murphy, supra note 6, at 703.

Pursuant to emergency authority granted to the U.S. Sentencing Commission under the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”), infra pp.
20–24, the Commission increased penalties significantly for corporate and other serious white-collar
frauds on April 18, 2003. Sentencing enhancements now apply to registered brokers, dealers and
investment advisors who defraud investors or employers. Sentencing is enhanced for white-collar
offenses affecting large numbers of victims. The amendment also increases penalties for those who
obstruct justice by destroying documents and records. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Apr.
18, 2003), available at http//www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0403.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). Note also
that on October 7, 2003, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
delivered its final report to the U.S. Sentencing Commission. The 138-page report makes 10
recommendations for revising the 1991 Guidelines. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the
Organizational
Sentencing
Guidelines
(Oct.
7,
2003)
available
at
http://www/ussc.gov/corp/advgrp.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). See also Stephany Watson,
Scandals May Result in More Corporate Compliance & Ethics Program Changes: Summary of the Report of the Ad
Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 22 PREVENTIVE L. RPTR. 1 (Fall 2003).
94

95

Brown, supra note 47, at 96.

96

48 C.F.R. § 1.000 (2003); Brown, supra note 47, at 96–97.
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satisfactory ethical record including no history of bid-rigging, fraud, or other related
behavior.97 If a contractor is debarred, it can be prevented not only from receiving
government contracts, but also from receiving grants, scholarships, loans, loan
guarantees, and insurance.98
Debarment or suspension is not automatic. The debarment rules state that:
[b]efore arriving at any debarment decision, the debarring official
should consider . . . [w]hether the contractor had effective standards
of conduct and internal control systems in place at the time of the
activity which constitutes cause for debarment or had adopted such
procedures prior to any Government investigation of the activity
cited as a cause for debarment.99
A debarring official may consider a variety of mitigating factors in addition to
effective standards of conduct.100
As with the Sentencing Guidelines, arguing for mitigation in the face of a
company’s loss of federal contracts may be too little, too late. But also like the
Sentencing Guidelines, the debarment rules provide a company with government
contracts—or one that aspires to have government contracts—strong incentives to
adopt a preventive compliance program.
D. The “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” of 2002
As on earlier occasions when scandals gave rise to increased regulation and
penalties, the recent scandals involving Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and
others, gave rise to the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).101 Sarbanes-Oxley is the most expansive federal
corporate governance legislation since the Great Depression. It addresses corporate
structure, accounting, auditing, fraud, liability, and reporting. For well-run
companies already practicing much of what it requires, the Act’s most significant
97

48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1(d) (2003).

98

48 C.F.R. § 9.405(c) (2003).

99

Brown, supra note 47, at 101 note 484.

100

48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a)(1) (2003).

Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”),
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 145 (2002).
101
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feature may be the new requirement for “rolling disclosures” of material changes in a
company’s financial condition or operation. These disclosures will prevent
companies from quietly engaging in corporate restructuring, refinancing, mergers,
and other significant business activities. However, Sarbanes-Oxley is new and has
not yet been completed. The Act charges the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) with promulgating rules to implement the Act’s reporting requirements;
however, all of the rules have not yet been finalized.102 Sarbanes-Oxley is addressed
in this article because many of its requirements relate to ethical lapses and regulate
ethical matters.
It is important to note that Sarbanes-Oxley applies only to public companies
and auditors of public companies.103 Specifically, the Act applies to any company
that (1) is registered under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, (the “Exchange Act”); (2) is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of
the Exchange Act; or (3) files, or has filed, a registration statement under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The SEC is charged with implementing most of
the Act’s provisions, which includes issuing substantial regulations to flesh out the
Act.104 SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins has explained that because Congress gave
the SEC a relatively short timeline to issue the regulations, many of them are general
and may undergo further changes.105
Sarbanes-Oxley also established the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. The Board is responsible for registering accounting firms, establishing
auditing standards, investigating and disciplining accounting firms, and enforcing
102 Dan Bailey, et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Government’s Latest Fix (Aug. 26, 2002), available
at http://www.arterhadden.com/publications/clientalert/alert082602b.asp (last visited Mar. 27,
2003). See also Stephen Labaton, Praise Runs Into Politics at S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2003, at C6,
stating that on the one-year anniversary of Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage, the Commission has not yet
finished issuing new rules related to the Act.

S. REP. NO. 107-205 ¶ 5001 (2002). “The statutory intent is that state regulatory authorities should
make independent determinations of the proper standards for small and medium-sized accounting
firms that do not audit public companies; state authorities should not presume that the standards
applied under the bill should apply to those companies under state regulatory schemes.” Id. Nonpublic companies may choose to substantially comply with Sarbanes-Oxley for public image,
financing, altruistic, or other reasons, however. Some of the Act’s provisions may indeed become the
standard of care for reasonable corporations.
103

104

15 U.S.C. § 77s (2002).

105 Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, United States Securities & Exchange Commission, remarks at the
University of Cologne, Germany (Feb. 5, 2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
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compliance with the Act.106 The establishment of the Board signals the end of selfregulation for the accounting industry.
Sarbanes-Oxley also amends the Exchange Act to prevent accounting firms
from performing auditing for companies that also receive non-audit services, such as
consulting, investment banking, and bookkeeping from the same accounting firm.107
Furthermore, accounting firms auditing public companies must rotate their partnerin-charge every five years, and if the accounting firm performing an audit employed
the audited company’s CEO, CFO, controller or Chief Accounting Officer in the
year before the audit, that firm may not perform the audit.108 Companies must also
have an independent audit committee responsible for overseeing audits, including
choosing the accounting firm, determining its compensation, and reviewing its work.
The audit committee members must be independent of the company, which can pay
them only for their services on the committee. In other words, audit committee
members cannot also be salaried officers or directors.109
Sarbanes-Oxley also obligates the SEC to adopt rules requiring the principal
executive officer and principal financial officer to certify in each annual and quarterly
report that they have reviewed the reports and that the reports do not contain
material misstatements or omissions of fact.110 The essence of the certification
106 Dan A. Bailey, et al., Summary of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Aug. 26, 2002), at
http://www.arterhadden.com/publications/clientalert/alert082602a.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2003).
107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

Under the Act, an issuer’s principal executive officer or officers and the principal financial officer
or officers must certify in each annual or quarterly financial report filed under section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Exchange Act (forms 10-K, 10-KSB, 20-F, and 40-F, 10-Q, 10-QSB) that:

110

the officer has reviewed the report; based on the officer’s knowledge, the report
does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading; based on such officer’s
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in the
report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report; the
signing officers are responsible for internal controls, have designed controls to
ensure that material information is made known to the officers on a timely basis,
have evaluated the effectiveness of those controls within 90 days prior to the
report, and have reported on their evaluation of the controls; the signing officers
have disclosed to the auditors and the audit committee all significant internal
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requirement is that CEOs and CFOs must ensure that financial statements are
materially correct to avoid false certification.111 In addition, CEOs and CFOs must
certify each periodic report that the SEC requires. The certification must state that
the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act and that the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of the company’s operations.112
Sarbanes-Oxley also outlaws most corporate loans to directors and
officers.113 Additionally, corporations subject to regulation under the Act must
develop and publish a corporate code of ethics, which must include a code of ethics
for senior financial officers.114
One of the Act’s more controversial features is its requirement that the SEC
issue rules governing legal counsel’s reporting on improper activity.115 Section 307 of
the Act requires lawyers to report evidence of a material violation of federal
securities law or a breach of fiduciary duty to a client company’s general counsel or
chief executive officer. If this first approach fails to generate an appropriate
response, the lawyer must report the matter to the company’s independent audit
board or board of directors.116 Before Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress had not attempted

control problems and any fraud involving employees who have significant internal
control responsibilities; and the signing officers have indicated on the report
whether there are any significant changes in internal controls or in other factors
that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of their
evaluation, including actions correcting weakness in control.
DAVID E. HARDESTY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 305-06 (2002).

AND

ACCOUNTING UNDER

THE

SARBANES-
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 101, at § 302. See generally Hardesty, supra note 110, at 1301–06.

112

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 101, at § 906.

Exceptions are home loans, consumer credit, credit cards and margin accounts in brokerage firms,
but they must be on the same terms as the corporation makes loans to all consumers. See Bailey, et al.,
supra note 102.
113

114 Gordon S. Kaiser, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley – A Play in One Act, 41 INFRASTRUCTURE No.
4 at 10 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/pubutil/summer_fall_2003.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,
2003).
115

Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, 89 A.B.A. J. 44, 48–49 (2003).

116

Id. at 48.
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to regulate lawyer conduct, as this had been considered a traditional province of the
states.117
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley enhances a number of white-collar criminal penalties
throughout the United States Code, including penalties for spoliation of evidence.118
The Act makes it a federal crime, punishable by up to twenty years in prison, for any
person knowingly to alter, destroy, mutilate, conceal, cover up, falsify, or make a
false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede,
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter by an
agency of the U.S. government.119
E. New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Rule Proposals
The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) has required companies to
comply with certain listing standards for 150 years.120 In 2001, “in the aftermath of
the meltdown of significant companies due to failures of diligence, ethics[,] and
controls,” the Chairman of the SEC asked the NYSE to review its corporate
governance listing standards.121 On April 4, 2003, the NYSE sent a corporate
governance rule filing to the SEC.122 The SEC has yet to approve the filing, which
would require all companies listed on the NYSE to meet specific corporate
governance standards.

117 The SEC dropped an additional lawyer disclosure proposal: that corporate counsel who did not
receive an appropriate response from the list of company executives in Section 307 be required to
“make a noisy withdrawal” from representing the corporation and report the incident to the SEC. Id.
At least one state has warned lawyers that its ethics rules regarding non-disclosure of client
confidences trump the permissive authority to disclose them contained in Sarbanes-Oxley. Mark
Hansen, State Fights the SEC, ABA JOURNAL AND REPORT (Aug. 29, 2003), at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/au29sec.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
118

See Bailey, et al., supra note 102.

119

Id. at 94.

120

Id.

121

Id.

Amendment No. 1 to the NYSE’s Corporate Governance Proposals, available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/amend1-04-09-03.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). The filing amended
and restated the NYSE’s original corporate governance proposals filed with the SEC on August 16,
2002, which reflected the recommendations of the NYSE’s Corporate Accountability and Listing
Standards Committee. Id.
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The SEC puts forward the following proposed standard as Section 10:
“Listed companies must adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics
for directors, officers[,] and employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the
code for directors or executive officers.”123 The proposal states that the SEC’s
choice of the words “must” and “should” is both intentional and specific.124 The
commentary to this section adds that:
no code . . . can replace . . . an ethical director, officer, or employee.
However, such a code can focus the board and management on areas
of ethical risk, provide guidance to personnel to help them recognize
and deal with ethical issues, provide mechanisms to report unethical
conduct, and help to foster a culture of honesty and accountability.125
Furthermore, “[e]ach listed company’s website must include its code of
business conduct and ethics.”126 While companies may adopt their own policies, the
rule states that all listed companies should address the “most important” topics,
including: conflicts of interest; taking personal advantage of corporate opportunities
learned of while in the corporation’s service; confidentiality; fair dealing with
competitors, suppliers and employees; protection and proper use of company assets;
compliance with laws, rules and regulations (including insider trading laws); and the
reporting of illegal or unethical behavior.127 Every year, each listed company’s CEO
must certify to the NYSE that the CEO is not aware of any company violations of
NYSE corporate governance listing standards.128
F. NASDAQ Rule Proposals
As of September 10, 2003, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(“NASD”) had adopted a number of corporate governance reforms, including a
requirement that all companies listed on the NASDAQ have a publicly available code
123

Id. at § 10.

124 “The use of the word “must” indicates a standard or practice with which companies are required
to comply. The use of the word “should” indicates a standard or practice that the Exchange believes
is appropriate for most if not all companies, but failure to employ or comply with such standard or
practice will not constitute a violation of NYSE standards.” Id. at note 2.
125

Id. at § 10.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id. at § 12.
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of conduct for all directors and employees.129 The codes must include the elements
of Section 406(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.130 The NASD also proposes heightened
requirements for independent directors, auditors, and nominating committees that
exceed both the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and those proposed for the
NYSE.131 The major U.S. securities exchanges and the SEC continue to work
together on corporate governance reform, and further refinement is likely.132 SEC
rules and those of the exchanges should be considered living documents.
V. BUSINESS REASONS FOR HAVING A COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
Despite seemingly persuasive and contemporary real-world reasons to
implement or update a corporate compliance and ethics program—remember the
handcuffed executives described in the introduction to this article—companies may
be somewhat hesitant to add a non-revenue producing layer to their structures. Yet
who can ignore the obvious example of the stock performance of Enron,
WorldCom, HealthSouth, and so many others? These companies were brought
down because of bad ethics.133
Some of the quantifiable benefits of a corporate compliance program that
may not be immediately visible include:
(1) meeting compliance expectations of government and private
customers; (2) facilitating the financing of business transactions
through documented compliance performance; (3) obtaining liability
insurance at a reasonable cost based on documented adherence to
legal and safety standards; (4) improving shareholder relations; (5)
enhancing community relations; (6) improving relationships with
NASD, Summary of NASDAQ Corporate Governance Proposals 14 (Sept. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/Corp_Gov_Summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).

129

Self-Regulatory Organizations: NASD Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment
No. 1, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,194 (Jul. 10, 2003).
130

131

See NASD, supra note 129, passim.

See, e.g., Letter from Hardwick Simmons, Chairman and CEO, NASDAQ, to the Honorable
Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, United States Securities & Exchange Comm’n (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/newsroom/news/pr2002/Corporate%20Governance.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2004).

132

133 Tom Taulli, Why Corporate America’s New Asset is Ethics, and Enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Ought
to Help the Stock Market, FINDLAW (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20030114_taulli.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2004).
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regulatory authorities; (7) satisfying penalty mitigation criteria under
sentencing guidelines and other penalty standards; and (8) regularly
compiling information necessary to comply with reporting
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission and other
authorities.134
Ample evidence suggests that ethical corporations are profitable
corporations. With ethical measures in place and an ethical corporate culture,
employees see that their employer is trustworthy.135 Thus, employees are more loyal,
have better morale, and are more likely to be innovative and cost-conscious.136
Moreover, companies with good reputations are better able to attract suppliers,
clients, and investment capital.137 Employees of organizations with formal ethics
programs are also more apt to report instances of misconduct, are more satisfied
with their employer’s response to any such misbehavior, and are more content with
their jobs.
Some studies have attempted to show a direct correlation between a
company’s ethics and its business performance. The results support the premise that
a values-based corporate culture is connected to superior corporate performance:
[T]here is clear evidence of a very strong connection between
superior corporate performance and a public statement by corporate
management of a strategic reliance on ethics as an element of internal
control and corporate governance. The link exists for both financial
and non-financial criteria. However, the mere presence of an ethics
code or even a well-executed ethics program does not itself cause
superior performance. The most critical factors appear to be both
the nature of the values upon which the corporate culture is based as
well as the strength of the top management commitment to ethical
Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46
EMORY L.J. 1113, 1168 (1997).
134

135

See Taulli, supra note 133.

136 Two fairly recent surveys show that ethical companies are better able to attract and retain
employees and that an ethical culture discourages misbehavior. Business Ethics Movement has Come Far,
but Long Road Lies Ahead, Surveys Reveal, 8 PREVENTION OF CORPORATE LIABILITY No. 5 at 41–44
(June 19, 2000). Interestingly, financial services and health care companies received the highest marks
for having effective ethics and compliance systems. The utility industry performed worst on this
score, “probably due to ongoing deregulation.” Id. at 44.
137

Id.

2004]

FOSTERING POSITIVE CORPORATE CULTURE

33

treatment of stakeholders, which is expressed in actions and not just
in words.138
Ethics programs themselves have been shown to enhance a company’s
financial performance, improve sales, improve brand image and reputation,
strengthen employee loyalty and commitment, limit vulnerability to activist pressure
and boycotts, avoid fines, court-imposed remedies and criminal charges, avoid loss
of business, and give greater access to capital.139 The effect seems to be circular: if a
firm has a strong ethics program, it develops a reputation for ethical business
practices, and lenders, suppliers, employees and others view it favorably because of
that reputation. Of course, the company must not merely “talk the talk” – it must
also “walk the walk.” Remember, Enron also had a corporate ethics and compliance
manual.
VI. ELEMENTS OF POSITIVE CORPORATE CULTURE
H. Lowell Brown notes that while government pronouncements regarding
the minimum elements of a corporate compliance program are important, a program
addressing only those elements is not sufficient to inspire a positive corporate culture.
“[C]orporate compliance programs should not only foster a culture of compliance
within the corporation, but also instill employee awareness of standards of
conduct.”140 Brown writes:
Each element of a compliance program should foster, in one way or
another, a culture of compliance. Although the issue of whether
compliance should be rule-based or value-based has been a topic of
debate, there must be formal policies that clearly articulate both the
company’s commitment to compliance and the standards to which
the conduct of employees will be held. Procedures must be
established for employees to follow in order to ensure compliance
with those standards. Employees must also be made aware of the
standards of conduct and the company’s implementing procedures.
Finally, the company must be vigilant in preventing possible
Dr. Curtis Verschoor, Corporate Performance is Closely Linked to a Strong Ethical Commitment,
STAKEHOLDER POWER, ¶ 28, June 2001, at
http://www.stakeholderpower.com/story.cfm?article_id=49 (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
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Business for Social Responsibility White Paper, BUSINESS ETHICS, 2001-2002, at 2–3, at
http://www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail.cfm?DocumentID=48809 (last visited Nov. 3,
2004).
139
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Brown, supra note 47, at 107.
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violations and in responding to violations that occur by taking
appropriate remedial measures and disciplinary action.141
Finding an effective way to open a dialogue about ethics and positive
corporate culture depends somewhat upon the message and the audience. Yet most
ethics educators agree that the object is not to lecture pedantically about what it
means to “be good” or to “do right,” but to engage the audience in stating its own
values. A variety of materials, such as cartoons, fiction excerpts, poems and real-life
stories, may be help stimulate discussion. It is also helpful to have program
participants share their own ethical dilemmas and work together to analyze, rather
than simply decide them.
The need for top management and CEO-level buy-in is repeatedly stressed as
a critical element of an effective corporate compliance program. The ethics program
must be seen as a serious corporate value for all who run the company, rather than a
nicety such as retirement planning or stress management classes. Employees must
perceive the program as more than a way to help top-earners in the company hold
onto those earnings. Part of the employee buy-in is demonstrating the risks of
unethical behavior to all firm employees:
Shareholders and creditors obviously can lose their money.
However, managers and employees may also place themselves at risk
if they invest in firm-specific skills and knowledge or if they rely on
implicit promises of future compensation or job security. The risk of
loss due to other participants’ misbehavior is separate from and in
addition to ordinary business risks and risk of “bad luck.”142
Indeed, when major firms go bankrupt and disappear, all of the employees lose their
jobs, and in the modern mega-corporation era, devalued corporate stock can wipe
out employee retirement accounts.
An additional element in a successful compliance program is repetition.
Handing out an ethics manual to new employees, or even accompanying it with an

141 Id. at 130–131. Rule-based compliance programs place primary emphasis on complying with laws
and regulations. Value-based compliance programs lead participants to the right choices by examining
and enhancing their ethics. The term “approach” means that rules and values are not taught
exclusively in either format, but rather identifies which approach is the focus or starting point of the
program.
142

Blair & Stout, infra note 145, at 1737 n.1.
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ethics training program as part of new-employee orientation, is not enough.143 The
best programs permeate the workplace. Training is frequently refreshed to
emphasize the importance of ethics to the company, and also to incorporate new law
into the program.144
What makes people act ethically? Some commentators have challenged the
traditional belief that, within a firm, legal and market incentives are most important
in encouraging cooperation and discouraging opportunistic behavior.145 Applying
social scientific principles, they argue that internal constraints of trust and
trustworthiness govern behavior as much as external financial and legal carrots and
sticks.146 And when conditions are right, the non-selfish aspects of personalities
emerge.147 Blair and Stout compiled data from the incidence of trust in social
dilemma games. They propose four findings:
(1) [T]rust is an empirical reality; individuals in social dilemma
experiments exhibit far more cooperative behavior than can possibly
be explained by external incentives; (2) [D]ifferent individuals
manifest different levels of willingness to cooperate in social dilemma
experiments; (3) [T]hese individual variations to some degree reflect
differences in individuals’ past experiences, suggesting that trust may
be a learned behavior; and (4) [T]rust appears to depend significantly
on individuals’ perceptions of others’ expectations, likely behaviors,
and social relationships to themselves; in some social situations

Presentation, discussion and re-visitation are essential to developing a culture of truthfulness and
safety in which employees can and will discuss and report ethics dilemmas. See Kidder, supra note 45,
at 99.

143

“Communication of the ethics message may be the single most important element of an ethics and
compliance program. The ethics message must be repeatedly communicated thought a multi-media
approach.” Copeland, supra note 26, at 339.

144

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2001).
145

“[O]ne of the most important lessons of trust is that cooperation is not always best promoted by
promising rewards and threatening punishments. To the contrary, attempts to employ external
incentives can often reduce levels of trust and trustworthiness within the firm by eroding corporate
participants’ internal motivations.” Id. at 1739.

146

147

Id. at 1743.

36

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 6

people predictably display trust, while in others they predictably do
not.148
“[E]conomic payoffs are not irrelevant. Although people cooperate in
social dilemmas even when they must incur a personal cost, the levels of cooperation
observed begin to decline as the cost of cooperating increases.”149
[T]he typical individual manifests at least two distinct personalities.
One might be described as a “competitive” or “self-regarding”
personality. When the competitive personality is dominant, an
individual will choose options that maximize [his or] her personal
payoffs without regard for effects on others, implying a preference
function indifferent to others’ welfare. The second self is a
“cooperative” or “other-regarding” personality.
When the
cooperative personality governs, an individual will choose options
that maximize group welfare over options that maximize [his or] her
own individual welfare, implying an other-regarding preference
function. Social context, tempered by considerations of personal
cost, determines when the cooperative personality emerges.150
The objective of compliance programs is to create a social context that
encourages cooperation.
Interestingly, merely instructing game players to cooperate induced a great
deal of cooperation.151 “People seem inclined to do what they are told to do,
especially when instructions come from someone who is perceived as something of
an authority.”152 This confirms the need to adopt a code of ethics and deliver it with
training and a visibly high level of management and CEO buy-in. A second
phenomenon is that group members cooperate more when they perceive a group
identity, such as when they feel that they are part of an “in group.”153 This suggests
that creating an identifiable workplace culture and getting employee buy-in may help
148

Id. at 1761 (emphasis added).
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Id.
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Id. at 1761–62.
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Blair & Stout, supra note 145, at 1764.
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Id. at 1770.
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Id. at 1770–71.
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to create an ethical culture. Also instructive is that individuals tend to cooperate
more (whether they are low or high trusters) when they view a social dilemma as
cooperative rather than competitive. If the task is viewed as competitive, even high
trusters will pursue self-interest and defect.154 Finally, when people view others in
their group as trustworthy, they tend to cooperate more. In the game experiments, if
participants were afforded some time to talk and get to know each other, they were
more likely to cooperate.155 This finding suggests that feeling like part of a group and
having some identity with a firm may foster a more ethical workplace.
VII. HOW TO IMPLEMENT A COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
A precise roadmap for creating or improving a corporate compliance
program depends on the size of company, its type of business, and whether a
compliance program is already in place.156 All successful programs, however, contain
important common elements.
This finding suggests that hyper-competitive workplace practices, such as Enron’s “legendary” sixmonth interval evaluations and “rank and yank” system, could be counterproductive to employee
honesty. Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME MAGAZINE, Dec. 30, 2002 at 55
(describing Sherron Watkins’s role in de-frocking Enron). See also Judy Olian, The Force in Performance
Reviews, PENN STATE SMEAL NEWS, at http://www.smeal.psu.edu/news/releases/oct02/force.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2004):
154

Others claim that such systems [such as “rank and yank”] breed internal
competitiveness and discourage collaboration and teamwork. They may foster a
“me against them” mentality since all performance judgments are relative, and each
employee clamors to make it into the higher performance categories. There are
also instances of significant deal-making among managers of work units that have
been pooled for purposes of review, each bargaining over employees who will be
“sacrificed” into the lowest category. Some managers deliberately carry employees
to the end of the performance year so that they have expendable employees to
insert into the lowest category.
Id. Rank and yank yields a paranoid work environment, in which employees are afraid to speak their
minds, innovate and report unethical behavior for fear of being labeled troublemakers. PETER C.
FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 52 (2002).
155

Blair & Stout, supra note 145, at 1771-72.

156 Company size is an interesting element. While small companies have the smallest staff and
resources available to create additional company programs, they may also be particularly at risk. With
fewer employees, there is likely greater responsibility and discretion in each position and less time for
busy managers to supervise workers. In a small firm, it may be more difficult for owners and
managers to argue that they were unaware of what a particular person was doing. Dana H. Freyer &
Benjamin B. Klubes, A Practical Approach to Implementing a Corporate Compliance Program for Smaller
Companies, 13 PREVENTIVE L. REP. 33, 34 (Winter 1994).
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A. Obtain Senior Management’s Commitment and Support
The first critical element is senior management commitment and support.157
“Compliance programs are not ends in themselves; they are risk management tools
to help the company achieve its broader goals of enhancing shareholder value and
profitability by being a responsible corporate citizen.”158 The Caremark case, the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, and other matters discussed in this article should convince
managers that corporate compliance and ethics programs are not luxuries. Indeed,
the President, Congress, and various regulatory agencies recently have made their
zeal for prosecuting corporate wrongdoers very clear.159 Ideally, a company’s CEO
or other high-ranking officer should lead the creation or revision of the firm’s ethics
and corporate compliance manual. Upper management’s high profile involvement
strongly conveys the company’s commitment to ethics and compliance. Similarly,
unethical CEO conduct strongly conveys the notion that ethics training programs
and messages are merely fig leaves. For example, the CEO who asks his assistant to
pick up his dry-cleaning or baby-sit on company time does little to discourage other
employees from running their own personal errands on company time, using
company equipment for personal matters or engaging in other minor rule-bending
that leads to a degeneration of high corporate ethics and morale. Upper-level
managers should also serve as role models for other employees.
B. Form a Compliance Committee
Once CEO buy-in is obtained, the company should form a compliance
committee consisting of as many of the following personnel as possible: CEO, CFO,
business line managers, general counsel, and corporate communications

157

Id. at 33.

158

Id.

159 President George W. Bush, Remarks at Signing of H.R. 3763, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Jul.
30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-1.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004). Two practitioners representing officers and directors charged with securities
violations note that as of July 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission has brought a record
number of cases against alleged securities law violators, yet the corporate scandals show no signs of
abating. Linda S. Stein, Annual Spring Meeting: Industries On the Edge, 42 INFRASTRUCTURE No. 3 at 7
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/pubutil/infra_sp03.pdf (last visited Jul. 1, 2003). See also
Alex Berenson, A U.S. Push on Accounting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/20033/04/09/business/09FEDS.html?pagewanted=print&position=top
(last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
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representatives.160 Companies should also include a few rank-and-file employees,
perhaps from a volunteer call, to provide a view from the trenches and provide
credibility with the employees who ultimately must follow the company’s policy. If
the company is unionized, the committee must include a union representative.
The compliance committee should also perform all of the usual
organizational tasks (e.g., deciding on a chairperson, note-taker, timelines, and so
on). The note-taker is especially important because a company should document
how it went about creating and implementing a compliance policy. As an additional
precaution, the note-taker should document this process in the presence of counsel
under conditions in which the attorney-client privilege will attach as appropriate.161
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines state that “high-level personnel” must be
responsible for implementing and administering the compliance program. The
company’s compliance office may be headed by a dedicated compliance officer, the
company’s general counsel, a compliance committee, or a committee of managers.
The initial compliance committee may be responsible only for creating the
company’s compliance policy, but it may also serve as the initial standing committee
responsible for ongoing compliance monitoring. There are pluses and minuses to
having the initial committee morph into the standing committee. The initial
committee will be most familiar with its own processes and the reasoning behind the
compliance program’s features, and its members may have a lot of enthusiasm for
seeing their theoretical work put into practice. However, a long-term commitment
may make it more difficult to obtain officers’ and managers’ time, and it may blind
some committee members to flaws in the program’s structure. The initial
compliance committee must also decide how to transition from creation to
implementation, and it must make a recommendation concerning that process to the
company’s board when it presents all the other aspects of the proposed program.

The CFO is needed to assess the compliance code’s effect on internal and external audit functions.
Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look
at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1638 (1990).
160

Too many lawyers and clients seem to believe that sitting in a meeting with a member of a bar
makes discussions privileged. Likewise, simply exchanging e-mail or drafts with counsel does not
convert non-privileged communications into privileged ones. Corporate counsel should thoroughly
acquaint themselves with state and federal law before assuming that communications are privileged.
See Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate
Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355, 377 (1987).
161
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C. Perform a Compliance Audit
The company should perform a compliance audit to determine which of its
activities pose improper risks. Legal counsel (for confidentiality reasons) or
counsel’s agent, such as a consultant, should interview the heads of all of the
business lines and frankly inquire into all of the company’s functions, identifying
areas of legal risk, especially for antitrust, environmental, employment, securities, and
regulated areas unique to the business. These interviews will be the basis for a report
to the board identifying the matters to be addressed in the corporate code and in
compliance training.162
The compliance audit may be the most important part of creating a corporate
compliance program. The audit will be used to identify weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in the company’s structure—the places that pose criminal or
significant civil exposure, where important responsibilities lie with very few
employees, and where direct reporting is limited.
D. Draft a Corporate Compliance Code
The compliance committee should then draft a corporate code, which
amounts to establishing compliance standards and procedures for employees and
other agents who are reasonably capable of reducing improper conduct, as required
by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.163 The code should:
(1) State the company’s commitment to ethical and legal conduct;
(2) Summarize the legal and ethical matters most relevant to the company’s
business, with a reference to other publications for specific legal requirements not
relevant to all business lines;
(3) Identify corporate compliance officers, how to reach them, how to ask
questions, and how to report ethics or compliance concerns confidentially;
(4) Explain how questions about ethics and compliance matters will be
answered; and

162

Freyer & Klubes, supra note 156, at 34.
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UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k).
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(5) Describe disciplinary measures that may be used to enforce the code as
well as to protect whistleblowers.164
The code must also be written plainly and concisely, or employees will not
read it. It must not contain incomprehensible “legalese,” or future litigation
opponents will argue that the code is meaningless. A representative from corporate
communications on the compliance committee could help ensure that the
appropriate tone and content are achieved.
E. Adopt the Compliance Code
The company’s board of directors should formally adopt and endorse the
code to set a “true tone from the top.”165 The code of conduct and company
adoption of the compliance program should be “rolled out” in a memorable way,
with a company-wide event, distribution of the code, and some mementos to
substantially connect the program with everyday work, such as computer screen
savers, notepads or calendars. Training programs should follow that are thorough,
brief, and lively.
F. Training and Enforcement
Mandatory training is an essential component of an effective program. New
hires should receive a copy of the code, and they should be required to certify that
they have received, read, and understand its terms.166 Training must be repeated
periodically, however, to ensure that the program penetrates the workforce as much
as possible. Part of managers’ compensation review should include evaluating their
compliance code implementation strategies. For example, the managers at Tyson
Foods created a cartoon campaign to draw attention to various aspects of its
compliance code, and they posted the cartoons throughout the workplace.167 There
are probably one hundred such ways to help bake ethics and compliance into the
corporate culture.
Ethics and compliance programs must be enforced, both to be effective and
to comply with Caremark and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Most programs
164

Freyer & Klubes, supra note 156, at 34.
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Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 160, at 1642.

166

Id.

Tyson Foods received a Certificate of Excellence from the American Advertising Federation for its
ethics posters. Copeland, supra note 26, at 340-41.
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contain an anonymous reporting hotline, and all programs should have procedures to
evaluate complaints in a particular amount of time, specify recommended actions,
provide guidelines for reporting to the complainant, and so on. The less discretion
involved in investigation and action, the better.
G. Drawbacks of Corporate Compliance Programs
The benefits derived from an effective compliance program are significant.
In a well-designed and well-maintained program, corporate ethical culture improves,
problems diminish, and employees report questionable practices before significant
harm is done. There can be downsides, however, to a pervasive, company-wide
program designed to ferret out problems, and measures must be taken to minimize
them.
First, the corporate compliance program will generate materials that will
establish an arguable standard of care for employee conduct that may be higher than
that of local tort law. While this argument may not be a winner, but it may well
survive summary judgment. It emphasizes the need for the corporation consistently
to enforce its ethics code to show that an employee who acts outside its boundaries
is acting without authority. Second, the corporate compliance program will generate
material showing its weaknesses, especially in complaint investigations and ethics
audits. Corporations must involve counsel in these activities, who must be wellversed in the limits of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product rule.168
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, corporations should also have an
effective document retention (and destruction) policy. Companies should pay
serious attention to voice and e-mail records because they are voluminous, and they
also tend to produce the most glib and dangerous evidence.
Companies should also assume that entire compliance manuals are
discoverable. In fact, they may choose to publish them on the company’s website as
part of their campaign to “establish compliance standards and procedures” as
required by the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines. Again, creating and enforcing the
compliance policy should involve legal counsel and it should be done, if possible, in
a way to keep sensitive information privileged. This advice is not meant merely as
company CYA—rather, effective corporate compliance programs must address
difficult matters and rectify them. The purpose of the privilege is not to keep

See generally Edward S. Rapier, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: How They Affect a
Civil Practice, 46 LA. B.J. 20, No. 1 (June 1998). See also supra note 144, regarding the nuances and
limitations of the attorney-client privilege.
168
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evidence out of court, but to encourage candor in adopting and enforcing a
meaningful program.
H. Enforcement
Enforcement is the final, obvious, and most difficult step following
implementation. Once a company has decided how to sanction bad behavior, it must
enforce those sanctions. Otherwise, not only is the entire compliance program
toothless, but the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are also automatically violated.169 A
corporation must be willing to carry out the punishment it adopts, even against topperformers, managers, loyal long-time employees, and so on. For some companies,
this is the most difficult part of a compliance program, but it is essential.170 Having a
structurally independent corporate compliance committee that is responsible for
investigating and recommending sanctions to the board may keep enforcement more
at arm’s-length and therefore easier to implement. In addition to consistently
enforcing procedures with appropriate sanctions, companies must monitor their
compliance programs and modify them if necessary to prevent recurrent violations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If further serious corporate scandals are to be avoided, or at least minimized,
companies must recognize that corporate culture plays a role in employee behavior.
Although people often have different views of what is ethical, corporate culture
nourishes and shapes those views. Corporate culture also may initially attract people
with similar views and, conversely, repel people with different views. The current
wave of business and accounting scandals, together with the devastating effects of
September 11, are in large measure responsible for the stock market jitters that
169

UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2, cmt. 3(k)(7) (2002).

Sometimes enforcement is the most difficult part of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for a company
to meet:
170

Once a program is implemented and standards of conduct established, they must
be met. Often, this effort requires a level of corporate determination and
dedication that is difficult to sustain under the pressures of daily commercial
activity. In some instances, the establishment of standards of conduct that are then
ignored could be the worst of all possible worlds. The government will use the
standards to try to prove bad intent—after all, government counsel will argue,
corporate officials knew what to do and merely chose not to do it—and private
plaintiffs will argue that the program set the standard of care that was breached.
Steven M. Kowal, Corporate Compliance Programs: A Shield Against Criminal Liability, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 517, 523 (1998).
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plague the U.S. economy. The importance of restoring ethics to business should be
clear.
In the end, however, each corporation must find its own way. Legal
compliance must be seamlessly integrated into the corporate culture
and must become an integral part of the product and not a post hoc
response to a problem. It is only when the directors, managers, and
employees create a culture of compliance that there can be any
reasonable assurance that the law will be obeyed and that corporate
liability, civil and criminal, will be avoided.171
In general, companies should put Wall Street in the proper perspective.
Feeding the market’s appetite for growth can make a company lose sight of other
business goals and demonstrates to employees that company returns are more
important than anything else—including being ethical and law-abiding.172
Companies should reward real performance. In addition to those measurable
in dollars, many other behaviors deserve recognition. Companies can reward intense
project work, commitment to training, community service, low industrial accident
rates, staff retention, and other achievements.173
Executives should also acknowledge poor performance. For example,
Warren Buffett is frequently cited for his honesty and candor, and his company has
been better off for it. In his 1999 letter to his company’s shareholders, Mr. Buffet
acknowledged the worst performance of his tenure without resorting to
euphemisms.174
Companies should also avoid unnecessary predictions. Nothing destroys
morale like unending, overly optimistic goals that can never be met. On the other
hand, companies can evaluate annual company performance at the end of the year,
when its achievement can be measured against the previous year’s real record.175
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, companies should remember that a
fish rots from the head.176 The straightforward, plain-talking CEO who makes it
clear that ethics really matter, sets the tone for the entire firm. CEOs should tell the
truth, adopt a serious ethics and compliance program, and get their own coffee.

ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH
thesis is that Enron failed for a single reason: its corporate culture.
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